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EXTENT OF THE LEGISLATURE'S RESERVE POWER TO CHANGE
COMMON LAW ATTRIBUTES OF CORPORATIONS
EDWARD R. HAYES*

Two recent cases, substantially similar in many facts but reaching
opposite results, raise questions as to what the common law attributes
of corporations are and whether they may be changed either by
action of the legislature itself or with legislative permission by
action of less than all stockholders of a corporation. In the first,
Farris v. Glen Alden Corp.,' a minority shareholder of Glen Alden
sued to enjoin what in form was the purchase by it of all assets of
List Industries. Glen Alden was paying for these assets with its stock
and by assuming List's liabilities. The Pennsylvania court held this
transaction was a de facto merger and should be enjoined because of
noncompliance with the state's statutory procedure for effecting a
merger. While some support for this holding can be found in earlier
decisions, 2 the Corporation Committee of the Pennsylvania Bar Association had persuaded the state legislature in 1957 to amend the
corporation law so, it was hoped, a different conclusion would be
reached. 3 This amendment denied the rights and remedies of a
dissenting stockholder to stockholders of a corporation purchasing
assets of another by issuance of stock. The lower court had held
the amendment inapplicable to the Glen Alden "purchase," but it had
intimated that the amendment would be unconstitutional if it eliminated the common law right of a shareholder to dissent from a purchase by his corporation of the assets of another corporation and to
then have his stock repurchased. The supreme court agreed that
the amendment was inapplicable but did not pass on its constitu4
tionality.
*Professor of Law, Drake University.
1. 393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958). Comments on the case appear in 59
CoLum. L. REv. 366 (1959), and 107 U. PA. L. REV. 420 (1959); it is also the
principal case discussed in Note, Corporations: Sale of Assets or De Facto
Merger? 47 CALlF. L. REV. 180 (1959), and is referred to in De Capriles, 1958
Annual Survey of American Law: Corporations, 34 N.Y.U.L. REV. 337, 362
(1959).
2. Troupiansky v. Henry Disston & Sons, Inc., 151 F. Supp. 609 (E.D. Pa.
1957); Marks v. Autocar Co., 153 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Pa. 1954); Bloch v. Baldwin Locomotive Works, 75 Pa. D. & C. 24 (C.P. 1950).
3. Hackney, The Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law Amendments, 19
U. PITT. L. REv. 51 (1957); Mulford, Corporate Distributions to Shareholders
and Other Amendments to the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law, 106
U. PA. L. REv. 536, 561 (1958). Both authors are members of the Committee.
Hackney, at 84, wrote: "[The amendments] have been added to make it clear
that an issue of stock for assets is not a de facto merger so as to give the
stockholders of the acquiring corporation appraisal rights, thus overruling
" See also 61 AwN. REP. PA. BAR
Bloch v. Baldwin Locomotive Works ...
Ass'N 277, 284 (1957).
4. The court said that whatever the committee's intent there was no
evidence the legislature had the same intent and, furthermore, that the
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Several months later a minority stockholder in Sun Chemical Corporation, a Delaware corporation, sued to compel it to rescind a
purchase, for its stock, of all assets of another corporation.5 Delaware
law permits the corporation to sell its stock for property, with the
judgment of the board of directors conclusive as to value, absent
actual fraud.6 The Delaware courts denied the stockholder any
relief, refusing to consider the transaction as a de facto merger and,
by implication, suggesting either that the stockholder has no common
law right to dissent from such a transaction and obtain repurchase
7
of his stock or that statutes have served to eliminate that right.
Does a stockholder have a right, at common law, to dissent and
have his stock repurchased when his corporation purchases the assets
of another business? If he does, is this a common law attribute of
corporations? What other common law attributes may there be? To
what extent has a legislature power to alter or modify these attributes, or to authorize alteration or modification by the holders of a
majority of a corporation's stock? The discussion will be directed
first to what attributes a corporation has apart from those bearing
on its relations with its stockholders; next, to what attributes are
connected with that relationship; then, to what powers the legislatures may have to affect those attributes; and thereafter, to consider
whether the two cases introducing this article are in conflict and how
legitimate complaints of minority stockholders might better be
handled.
I. CORPORATE ATTRIBUTES
Concepts of the corporation vary from legal to socio-economic.
There are a number of legal theories as to the nature of a corporation.8 And there is not entire agreement as to the attributes of a
corporation as such.
language used was inapt to achieve the committee's purpose. It would be
necessary, thought the court, to have the statute provide that a purchase
of assets which, under the circumstances, amounted to a de facto merger
entitled the dissenting stockholder of the purchaser to no appraisal rights.
See 107 U. PA. L. REV. 420 (1959).
5. The corporation whose assets Sun was purchasing, Ansbacher-Siegle
Corporation, was wholly owned by Sun's president, who also owned 2.8%
of Sun's common stock. Sun was approximately fourteen times as large as
Ansbacher-Siegle.
6. DEL. CODE ANN. tit.8, § 152 (1953).

7. Heilbrunn v. Sun Chemical Corp., 150 A.2d 755 (Del. 1959), affirming
146 A.2d 757 (Del. Ch. 1958). Both courts denied defendant's motion to
dismiss a second alleged cause of action charging breach of fiduciary duty on
the part of the firm's president.
8. Compare CARTER, THE NATURE OF THE CORPORATION AS A LEGAL ENTITY
(1919), with DRUCKER, CONCEPT OF THE CORPORATION (1946). See also BERLE,
STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATE FINANCE 23 (1928); Machen, Corporate
Personality, 24 HARv. L. REV. 253, 347 (1911).
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Blackstone said there are five powers inseparably incident to every
corporation:
1. To have perpetual succession.... 2. To sue or be sued, implead or be
impleaded, grant or receive, by its corporate name, and do all other
acts as natural persons may. 3. To purchase lands, and hold them, for the
benefit of themselves and their successors: which two are consequential
to the former. 4. To have a common seal .... 5. To make by-laws for the
better government of the corporation ....

9

According to Dewing, the corporation embodies four ideas:
It is the formal expression of an agreement by two or more persons;
it receives the creating touch of a sovereign power-the king, the state
or a representative of the state; it has, in itself and apart from its members, such reality that it can acquire and hold money and property, enter
into contracts, sue and be sued both in law and equity, and otherwise
assume the responsibilities of a property-owning human being; and
finally, it has a length of life not subject to the mortal limitations of
human beings.O
Assuming, at this point, that a corporation results from a contract
between incorporators, and with the state of incorporation, the other
attributes mentioned by Blackstone and Dewing can often be obtained by unincorporated associations and may be denied to corporations or rejected by the associates on behalf of the corporation." A2
seal may once have been a necessity, but is no longer essential.'
Corporate powers to hold property, especially real estate, have been
limited; 13 the power to contract may be restricted. 14 The power of
perpetual succession has not necessarily meant unlimited life but
refers to the ability of the corporation to exist though a stockholder
should die and the thought that ownership interests are freely alienable without termination of the organization. In many states corporate existence has been limited to a definite term of years, although
9. 1 BLACKSTONE, COmMENTARIES 475-76 (7th ed. 1773).
10. 1 DEWING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 4-5 (4th ed. 1941).
11. 1 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 5-14 (perm. ed. 1931); Machen,

Corporate Personality, 24 HARV. L. REV. 253, 347, 350-51 (1911); Williston,
History of the Law of Business CorporationsBefore 1800, 2 HARV. L. REV. 105,
116 (1888).
12. 1 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 11, § 9; Williston, supra note 11, at 118.
13. 1 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 11, § 11.

In some states corporations

could not own real estate other than that used in connection with their
manufacturing, mining, retailing or similar activities. In Dodge v. Ford
Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668, 3 A.L.R. 413 (1919), noted for its
holding compelling declaration of a dividend, the plaintiff unsuccessfully
argued that a Michigan statute which limited the capital stock of a corporation to not over $50,000,000 meant that corporate capital and surplus
could not exceed that amount.
14. This most commonly occurs as a restriction of foreign corporations doing business in a state without properly qualifying to do business. STEVENS,
CORPORATIONS § 207 (2d ed. 1949). See Hudson, Contracts in Iowa RevisitedIllegality, 8 DRAKE L. REV. 3, 6 (1958).
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renewal of life is permitted. 15 The associates may agree to restrict
transferability of stock and probably could agree that corporate existence would cease upon the death of any or of a specified stockholder. 16
II. CORPORATE-STOCKHOLDER ATTRIBUTES

Many attributes have been suggested as arising from the relationship of the corporation to its stockholders and the stockholders' relation inter sese. These include: limited liability for corporate debts;
pre-emptive rights in additional issues of stock; the right to insist
that the purposes of the corporation be confined to those stated in
the charter; the right to make or approve amendments to the charter;
the right to dissent from attempts to alter the corporation through
merger, consolidation or sale or acquisition of substantially all the
assets of a business; power to dissolve and to share in assets on dissolution; power to examine books and records of the corporation;

power to vote, sometimes to cumulate votes; a right to dividends; a
right to sell one's own stock; and power to act for the corporation
either as plaintiff in a derivative suit or by defending actions against
7
the corporation.'
Limited liability of stockholders for corporate debts is a statutory
matter today and for many years has been covered either in general
statutes or in charters granted specially by legislatures. There appears
to be little or no direct authority as to the existence of a common law
limited liability. Writers are not in complete agreement on the
point. 18 Most courts which considered the question have assumed the
15.

BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS

16. 2

§ 307 (rev. ed. 1946).

O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS §§ 7.01-7.29, 9.06 (1958).
See SEARS, THE NEW PLACE OF THE STOCKHOLDER 198-202

17.
(1929); Schmidt,
Constitutional Limitations upon Legislative Power to Alter Incidents of the
Shareholder's Status in Private Corporations,21 ST. Louis L. REV. 12 (1935).
18. Note, The Iowa Nonprofit Corporation:Personal Liability of Members;
Dissolution, 8 DRAKE L. REV. 142, 143-44 n.10 (1958) states: "Hohfeld, Nature
of Stockholders' Individual Liability for CorporationDebts, 9 COLUM. L. REV.
285 (1909), at 302, refers to the 'so-called "common-law" rule of limited
liability,' and at 302-05 discusses unlimited liability companies. Stevens,
Stock Issues Under the Uniform Business CorporationAct, 13 CORNELL L. Q.
399 (1928), cites Myers v. Irwin . . . [note 19 infra] and at 400 says: 'However, the limitation of the individual liability of shareholders is by no means
an inseparable incident of incorporation. Immunity from individual liability
has not always been the rule, and today there are statutes under which full
liability of shareholders is either optional or compulsory.' Warren, Safeguarding the Creditors of Corporations, 36 HARV. L. REV. 509 (1923), at 519,
says: 'Members are not even liable to a limited extent. The corporation is

liable, and it is the only legal unit that is liable. There has never been a
decision by an English court in violation of this principle.' Warren does
point out, however, that according to 1622 minutes of the Virginia Company,
which had no provision regarding member liability or non-liability, the
directors disagreed as to the legal consequence; and he implies that the
rule might be different for joint stock corporations than for other chartered
companies. Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before
1800, 2 HAuv. L. REV. 149 (1888) says, at 160, 'No doubt it has been settled
for a long time that individual members are not liable for the debts of a

1959 ]

COMMON LAW ATTRIBUTES OF CORPORATIONS

265

common law rule to be one of limited liability, but the assumption
usually has been unnecessary to the ultimate decision. 9
The stockholder's pre-emptive right is a prior right or option to subscribe to stock being issued by the corporation, in proportion to his
holding, before the stock is issued to the public. This right has usually
corporation,' and cites Myers v. Irwin, but at 162 he says, 'Indeed, there is
no case decided before the present century which is inconsistent with the
theory that members of a corporation are thus liable, though very possibly
that idea became contrary to the general understanding.' None of the articles
cite either Terry v. Little or Pollard v. Bailey [note 19 infra]."
Machen, Corporate Personality, 24 HARV. L. REv. 347, 350 (1911), says that
limited liability is not a criterion of corporateness.
The satirical comments of Sir W. S. Gilbert, in his ballad on "limited liability," written after passage of the British Companies Act of 1863, indicated
that some people in England did not consider limited liability automatically to
result from incorporation. The ballad is reprinted in BaLE & WARREN, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF Busmss ORGANIZATIONS (CORPORATIONS) 206
(1948).
19. In several cases in which the court stated or assumed that limited
liability was the common law rule, the only issue before the court was
interpretation of a statutory or legislatively granted charter provision relating to limited liability. Terry v. Little, 101 U.S. (11 Otto) 216, 217 (1879);
Pollard v. Bailey, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 520, 526 (1874); Deming v. Bull, 10
Conn. 409 (1835) (charter provided for unlimited liability; stockholder
contended this meant his liability on any one claim was proportional to his
percentage of stock ownership, but court held his liability unlimited so far
as creditors were concerned although as between all the stockholders his
responsibility might be pro rated); Shafer v. Moriarty, 46 Ind. 9 (1874);
Corning v. McCullough, 1 N.Y. (1 Comst.) 47 (1847) (six-year statute of
limitations pertaining to contract actions, rather than three-year statute
pertaining to claims founded on statutes providing for forfeiture or cause
where the benefit is limited to the party aggrieved, held applicable to claim
based on limited liability statutes); New England Commercial Bank v.
Stockholders of the Newport Steam Factory, 6 R.I. 154 (1859). The two
Supreme Court cases cited were both written by Chief Justice Waite; the
second cites the first as authority, but the first cites no authority. In People
ex rel. National Exp. Co. v. Coleman, 133 N.Y. 279, 31 N.E. 96 (1892), a
joint-stock company sought review of an assessment taxing its capital as if
it were a corporation. It was argued that as the legislature had granted so
many corporate attributes to joint-stock companies, they were corporations;
the court said this was not so, for limited liability of members was an
essential, and common law, attribute of a corporation, and the legislature
had not eliminated individual liability of the joint-stock associate. The
case most frequently cited for common law limited liability is Myers v.
Irwin, 2 S.& R. 367 (Pa. 1816), a case which turned on whether a particular
unincorporated bank had become incorporated by implication by a statute
which provided that if any association be formed for banking purposes,
every member should be individually and personally liable for its debts.
The court thought that the statute did not have the effect contended for
"because the personal responsibility of the stockholder is inconsistent with
the nature of a body corporate." 2 S. & R. at 371.
On the other hand, a South Carolina chancellor in 1826 and the appellate
court reviewing his decision in 1828, assumed that the individual shareholder
was fully liable unless the legislature provided otherwise. Hume v. Winjaw
& Wando Canal Co., 1 Car. L. J. 217 (1830), reprinted in 4 AmER. L. MAG. 92
(1844). IowA CODE § 491.5 (1958) in part provides that articles of incorporation shall contain a provision "whether private property is to be exempt from
corporate debts," which may imply a belief that there is no common law
limited liability. The new Iowa Business Corporation Law, Iowa Laws 1959,
ch. 321, § 24, limits shareholder liability to the unpaid portion of the consideration for which his shares were issued or are to be issued.
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been held to extend only to newly authorized issues of shares. 20 The
court in the first case recognizing a right of this type said the stockholders were partners and when the capital of the corporation was
increased all shareholder-partners should share in the beneficial opportunity presented.21 The pre-emptive right is usually considered
as a protection against dilution of voting power and against issuance
of shares at an inadequate price to favored persons. In the closely
held corporation the right is especially important to prevent dilution
of an interest, although not always effective to accomplish that objective.22 Where the stock of a corporation is widely held, dilution
of voting power may be inconsequential, and the right may serve
only to provide financial bargains to existing stockholders. 23 Proper
recognition by the publicly held corporation of the varied rights in
a new issue belonging to shareholders of different classes becomes
difficult. Because of this fact and of a feeling by some that claims to
pre-emptive rights are often raised by "pirates," the doctrine has been
20. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 209 (rev. ed. 1946); 11 FLETCHER PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 5136 (rev. ed. 1958); LATTIN, CORPORATIONS 424 (1959); 1
O'NEPL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 3.39 (1958); STEVENS, CORPORATIONS § 111 (2d
ed. 1949); Morawetz, The Pre-emptive Right of Shareholders, 42 HARv. L.
REV. 186 (1928); Comment, 5 ST. Louis U. L. J. 297 (1958). Usually no
pre-emptive right is recognized where the stock issued is treasury stock, or
is issued in connection with a merger or to pay for property purchased by
the issuer. At one time it was thought that originally authorized but
unissued stock could later be issued without recognition of pre-emptive
rights, but several cases suggest otherwise. Ross Transp., Inc. v. Crothers,
185 Md. 573, 45 A.2d 267 (1946); Dunlay v. Avenue M Garage & Repair Co.,
253 N.Y. 274, 170 N.E. 917 (1930); Drinker, The Pre-emptive Right of Shareholders to Subscribe to New Shares, 43 HARV. L. REV. 586, 603 (1930). Ques-

tions of applicability of pre-emptive rights also arise when the stock issued
is of a new class, or is of one class and the corporation has several classes

outstanding, or when the security issued is convertible into stock.

21. Gray v. Portland Bank, 3 Mass. 364, 3 Am. Dec. 156 (1807).
22. The owner of 20% of the outstanding stock in a corporation failed to
exercise his pre-emptive right to subscribe to new shares, which would have
cost $136,000, and he attempted to enjoin the new issue, alleging that he did
not have the necessary funds. The issue was permitted, even though his

interest was thereby reduced to 1/175. Hyman v. Velsicol Corp., 342 Ill. App.
489, 97 N.E.2d 122 (1951). See also Bellows v. Porter, 201 F.2d 429 (8th Cir.
1953); Note, Close Corporations-BadFaith of Majority, 35 N.C.L. REV. 271,
272n.11 (1957), refers to a comment, attached to a bill introduced in the
North Carolina legislature, that "actually, peihaps more 'squeezes' of shareholders (particularly the family of a deceased substantial shareholder)
have been engineered by use of pre-emptive rights, at far below value, than
by their denial." See Morawetz, The Pre-emptive Right of Shareholders, 42
HAzv. L. REV. 186, 188 (1928); Note, 1959 DuKE L. J. 116.
23. Some corporations, such as those in the Bell Telephone System, frequently utilize pre-emptive rights in issuing new securities, even though
state law may permit denial of such rights. As the issue price often is less
than the market price for the security, the pre-emptive right may be sold at
a profit. This opportunity to profit may also tend to maintain a good market
for the corporation's already outstanding shares.
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criticized, 24 and statutes in many states permit corporations in their
charters to limit or deny pre-emptive rights.2
Corporate assets should not be used for purposes other than those
explicitly or impliedly agreed to in the corporate contract. As Ballantine puts it:
Each shareholder or member is entitled to say to the others and to the
corporation: "I became a member in a concern formed for certain
purposes, and upon terms which were agreed upon by all of us, and you
have no right, without my consent,26to engage me in any other concern,
or to hold me to any other terms."

An early American exposition of this view is in Zabriskie v. Hackensack & N. Y. R.R. 27 The company, originally chartered to build a
five-mile railroad between Hackensack and an existing railroad,
which it had completed and was operating, obtained an amendment
to its charter authorizing a twelve-mile extension of the road from
Hackensack through more difficult terrain to a little used branch of
the Erie Railroad. Zabriskie, an objecting stockholder, successfully
enjoined building of the extension. The New Jersey court in holding
for him relied in part on an English decision, Natusch v. Irving.28 Both
cases argue that in a partnership fundamental changes in the nature
of the business may not be made except with unanimous consent of
the partners and that the same rule applies to corporations. Some
courts used similar reasoning to prevent corporate contributions
to charitable or civic organizations. 29 These decisions indicate that
the stockholder has the common law right to insist that the corporate
purposes be confined to those stated in the charter and that his con24. 1 O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 3.39 (1958); Ballantine, Questions of
Policy in Drafting a Modern CorporationLaw, 19 CALIF. L. REV. 465 (1931);
Drinker, The Pre-emptive Right of Shareholders to Subscribe to New Shares,
43 HARV. L. REV. 586 (1930); Frey, Shareholders' Pre-emptive Rights, 38
YALE L. J. 563 (1929); Note, 5 ST. Louis U. L. J. 297 (1958).
25. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 209 (rev. ed. 1946); LATTIN, CORPORATIONS
425, 429 (1959); 1 O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 3.39 (1958). In some states
the statute eliminates pre-emptive rights unless specifically provided in the
articles. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1106 (1953). In others, the statute merely
permits the articles to contain provisions eliminating pre-emptive rights.
E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b) (3) (1953). See Ballantine, Questions of
Policy in Drafting a Modern Corporation Law, 19 CALI. L. REV. 465, 469
(1931); Note, 5 ST. Louis U. L. J. 297 (1958).
26. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 103 at 258 (rev. ed. 1946).
27. 18 N.J. Eq. 178, 90 Am. Dec. 617 (1867). Accord, Kenosha, R. & R.I. R.R.
v. Marsh, 17 Wis. 13 (1863).
28. 2 Coop. T. Cott. 358, 47 Eng. Rep. 1196 (Ch. 1824); Gow, PARTNERSHIP,
App. II, at 404 (2d Eng. ed. 1825).
29. Davis v. Old Colony R.R., 131 Mass. 258, 41 Am. Rep. 221 (1881);
BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 85 (rev. ed. 1946). See cases on corporate giving
See also Crane,
listed in A.NDREWS, CORPORATION GIVING 317-27 (1952).
Enlargement of Corporate Authority Under the Reserved Power, 15 U. Prr.
L. REV. 427 (1954).
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sent must be obtained to amendments to the charter which fundamentally change the stated purposes.30
The character of the enterprise in which a stockholder invested may
be changed in various other ways. His corporation may merge or
consolidate with another. That other may be active in the same, in related or in different business endeavors. His corporation may sell
its assets to another, for stock in the other. Or his corporation may
purchase the assets of another. Has the stockholder any common law
right to object to any of these transactions? Many years ago the
Pennsylvania legislature passed a statute authorizing a specially
chartered railroad (the charter was not subject to any reserved power
to alter, amend or repeal) to merge with another railroad, but the
statute failed to provide that stockholders dissenting from the merger
were entitled to have their stock repurchased. One stockholder sued
to enjoin the merger, arguing that this fundamental change required
his consent so that he could not be compelled to become a stockholder in a different company. In Lauman v. Lebanon Valley R.R.,3 '
the state court refused to enjoin the merger but held that the dissenter
did have a common law right to be paid the value of his stock. The
court's theory was that unanimous consent is not necessary to
dissolution, that merger would result in dissolution of the old corpora32
tion, and therefore unanimous consent to merger was unnecessary.
However, the court assumed it would be unconstitutional to compel
the dissenter to take stock in the new corporation 33 and for this reason
held that he was entitled to have his old stock repurchased even
though the statute did not provide such a remedy. As most states
now have merger statutes which permit a majority to authorize
merger and provide for repurchase of dissenters' shares, the question
30. See Levy, Rights of Dissenting Shareholdersto Appraisal and Payment,
15 CORNELL L. Q. 420 (1930). Warren points out that in Black v. Del. &
Raritan Canal Co., 22 N.J. Eq. 130 (1871), the author of the Zabriskie opinion
said a majority could dissolve. Warren, Voluntary Transfers of Corporate
Undertakings, 30 HARV. L. REv. 335, 357 (1917).
31. 30 Pa. 42 (1858).
32. Unanimous consent to dissolve is unnecessary where the association is
a partnership, although in some circumstances dissolution by the action of
one partner may be a breach of contract for which damages will lie. UNIFORM
PARTNERsHIp ACT § 31; CRANE, PARTNERSHIP §§ 74-75 (2d ed. 1952). It is not
so clear that this is true where the association is a corporation. See notes
48-51 infra, and text supported thereby. But see Warren, Voluntary Transfers of Corporate Undertakings, 30 HARV. L. REV. 335 (1917).
The Lauman court's refusal to enjoin the merger has been criticized. 2
CooK, CORPORATIONS § 502 (8th ed. 1923); Levy, Rights of Dissenting Shareholders to Appraisal and Payment, 15 CORNELL L. Q. 420, 423 (1930).
33. In Lauman v. Lebanon Valley R.R., 30 Pa. 42 (1858), the court, dis-

cussing compelling a dissenter to take the stock of the surviving corporation,
said at 47: "We cannot presume that the legislature intended to assume or
exercise any unconstitutional power over private contracts, but only that,
supposing that they were granting a valuable privilege, they omitted to make
provision for those who should refuse to accept it."
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of common law rights in connection with mergers usually is limited
34
to cases involving corporations organized prior to merger statutes.
Fewer states have statutes concerning sales of substantially all assets
of a corporation, and several that have statutes do not provide for
the purchase of stock of dissenters. 35 Usually where there is no
statutory authority to merge, acquisition of assets is used to accomplish the same objectives. 36 There is a definite split among courts
on the question of whether a stockholder objecting to a sale of all
assets of his corporation has the common law right to prevent such
a sale.37 Some courts say that he cannot be compelled to become a
stockholder in the purchasing corporation; and, therefore, even
though the assets were sold for the purchaser's stock, the dissenter
must get cash.3 Ballantine feels the better view is to deny power to
object to a sale of substantially all assets, at least where the sale
was not to freeze out a minority shareholder. 39 In most states the
stockholder's objections to a good faith sale will be ignored where
34. The argument has been made that merger involved dissolution and

that under his statutory appraisal right the dissenter with preferential rights

on dissolution should receive the amount called for under those rights rather
than the lower current value of his shares. This argument was upheld in

Petry v. Harwood Elec. Co., 280 Pa. 142, 124 Atl. 302, 33 A.L.R. 1249 (1924),
but was rejected in Anderson v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 87 N.E.2d 384 (C.P.
Ohio 1948). Apparently since Petry it has been the practice in Pennsylvania
to provide in the corporate contract that merger shall not be treated as a
dissolution. DODD & BAKER, CASES ON CORPORATIONS 1332 n.7 (2d ed. 1951).
See discussion of cases which allowed appraisal without statutory authority
and interpretative problems present in various statutes authorizing appraisal
in Lattin, Remedies of Dissenting Stockholders under Appraisal Statutes,
45 HARv. L. REV. 233 (1931).

MD.ANN. CODE art. 23, § 73 (1957), denies appraisal to shareholders of the
"surviving corporation" in a merger unless there is a substantial effect upon
their contract rights.
35. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §§ 282, 286 (rev. ed. 1946); Ballantine, Ques-

tions of Policy in Drafting a Modern Corporation Law, 19 CAIF. L. REV.
465, 482 (1931); Hills, Consolidation of Corporations by Sale of Assets and
Distribution of Shares, 19 CALIF. L. REV. 349 (1931); Lattin, Minority and
Dissenting Shareholders' Rights in Fundamental Changes, 23 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 307, 311 (1958); Weiner, Payment of Dissenting Shareholders,
27 CoLmvm. L. REV. 547 (1927); Note, 67 YALE L. J. 1288 (1958); 47 CALI=.
L. REV. 180 (1959).

36. See authorities cited in note 35 supra.
37. BALLANTINE,

CORPORATIONS

§§ 281, 283 (rev. ed.

1946).

See Warren,

Voluntary Transfers of Corporate Undertakings, 30 H~Av. L. REV. 335, 353-66
(1917); Note, 67 YALE L. J. 1288 (1958).
38. Finch v. Warrior Cement Corp., 16 Del. Ch. 44, 141 Atl. 54 (1928);
Inhabitants of Waldoborough v. Knox & L. R.R., 84 Me. 469, 24 Atl. 942
(1892); Ringler v. Atlas Portland Cement Co., 301 Pa. 176, 151 Atl. 815 (1930);
Koehler v. St. Mary's Brewing Co., 228 Pa. 648, 77 Atl. 1016, 139 Am. St. Rep.
1024 (1910). Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590 (1921)
permitted a stock distribution over a dissenter's objections where the stock
to be distributed was listed and actively traded on a national exchange-it
could be treated as the equivalent of money. See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS
§ 283 (rev. ed. 1946).
39. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS
PORATIONS 511 (1959).

§ 281

(rev. ed. 1946).

See LATTIN, COR-
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his corporation is in failing condition. 40 Until recently there was little
authority regarding a stockholder's right to object when his corporation purchased substantially all the assets of another, and it seems
generally to have been doubted that he could object. However, a
recent federal district court decision in Pennsylvania, following a
theory derived from the Lauman case, held that the shareholder of
the purchaser did have a common law right to dissent. 41 One of
the objectives of the Pennsylvania Bar Association's proposed amendments, which as mentioned earlier were adopted, was to overrule
this decision.42 In the Glen Alden case the lower court said the statute
would be unconstitutional if it had this effect, 43 but the supreme court

by treating the transaction as a de facto merger avoided the question.
Actually, in Glen Alden it might have been argued that although
the transfer of assets was in form a purchase by Glen Alden, in substance it was a sale instead-for Glen Alden issued so much stock
that the selling corporation, List, owned more than half the shares of
Glen Alden." List was a highly diversified holding company, none
of whose activities was similar to Glen Alden's. As a result the
interest of the Glen Alden stockholder would be much diluted and
he would own stock in a much different company. Perhaps Sun
Chemical is distinguishable in this aspect. There the company purchased was smaller, engaged in related activities, and stock ownership was not so severely diluted. 45 (Or is this just a little bit pregnant?)
Although Natusch v. Irving and Zabriskie drew parallels between
40. Price v. Holcomb, 89 Iowa 123, 56 N.W. 407 (1893); Phillips v. Providence

Steam-Engine Co., 21 R.I. 302, 43 Ati. 598 (1899); BALLANTINE, CORPORATbONS

§ 281 (rev. ed. 1946). Contra (at least as to railroad corporations), South
W. R.R. v. Benton, 206 Ga. 770, 58 S.E.2d 905 (1950).
41. Bloch v. Baldwin Locomotive Works, 75 Pa. D. & C. 24 (C.P. 1950);
see also Marks v. Autocar Co., 153 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Pa. 1954).
42. See note 3 supra.

43. Only a concurring justice so held, but the majority opinion intimates
that the statute if so interpreted would be unconstitutional. Brief for the
Committee on Corporation Law of the Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n, p.1, Farris
v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958).
44. Prior to the attempted sale List owned 38.5% of Glen Alden's outstanding shares, and had placed three directors on Glen Alden's board. The
acquisition of these shares had been financed and Glen Alden was to assume
the obligations remaining under the financing arrangement. After the sale
List would own 76.5% of Glen Alden's stock (its original acquisition not
being included in the assets sold) and would have eleven of the seventeen
directors. If the transaction had been in form a purchase by List, several
adverse tax consequences would have followed. See 47 CAI". L. Rv. 180
(1959); 59 CoLum. L. REv. 366 (1959); 107 U. PA. L. REV. 420 (1959).

45. List Industries was considerably larger than Glen Alden, and engaged
in fields different from those in which Glen Alden operated. Both Delaware
courts attempt to distinguish Glen Alden in part on these grounds. Heilbrunn
v. Sun Chemical Corp., 150 A.2d 755, 758 (Del. 1959); 146 A.2d 757, 759 (Del.
Ch. 1958). Plaintiffs, who owned 1,000 shares of Sun, had their interest diluted
from a 1/1, 196,283 holding to 1/1, 421,283.
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partnership and corporation law4 6 with respect to unanimous consent to fundamental changes, a similar parallel has not been drawn
with respect to the right of one of the associates to have the organization dissolved. A partner has the absolute right to have his partnership dissolved at any time, although in some circumstances dissolution
may be a breach of a contract for which damages will lie.47 But no
stockholder has the right at common law to compel dissolution of
his corporation unless permitted by the corporate agreement. 48 Perhaps the concept of corporate immortality has been influential here.
Equity courts have frequently held also that they lack power to
decree dissolution of a solvent corporation on the demand of a
minority shareholder where no statute provides such power. 49 There
was even some uncertainty in early decisions whether dissolution
could be effected by majority vote of stockholders, at least absent
provision therefor in the charter.5 0 If dissolution does occur, the shareholders are to be treated alike and to receive their pro rata share of
assets where distribution is in kind or cash, unless the corporate
51
agreement or statute provides otherwise.
At common law the shareholder has the right to inspect corporate
books and records, either in person or through representatives such
as an accountant or an attorney. In order to protect the interests of
other shareholders and of the corporation this right is limited rather
than absolute. The inspection must be at a reasonable time, and
the shareholder must be acting in good faith for legitimate purposes,
which can be either in the corporate interest or in protection of
46. Courts have spoken of corporations as partnerships and of stockholders
as partners in various instances where the corporation was recognized as a
separate entity, and seemingly considered them to be treated similarly.
Gray v. Portland Bank, 3 Mass. 364, 3 Am. Dec. 156 (1807); Jones v. Concord
& M. R.R., 67 N.H. 119, 131, 38 Atl. 120, 121 (1892) (Doe, C.J., said: "Before
the [merger, each], being business corporations, were partnerships, with
common-law partnership rights and liabilities, modified in some respect by
statute."); Dow v. Northern R.R., 67 N.H. 1, 36 Atl. 510 (1887) (Doe, C.J.).
But see: Livingston v. Lynch, 4 Johns. Ch. 573 (N.Y. 1820) (Kent, Chancellor).
47. See note 32 supra.
48. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §§ 301-06 (rev. ed. 1946); LATTIN, CORPORA-

TIoNs 551, 556 (1959); STEVENS, CORPORATIONS §§ 198-99 (2d ed. 1949); Note,
Rights of the Minority Stockholders to Dissolve the Closely Held Corporation,

43 CALIF. L. REV. 514 (1955). The Note suggests allowing a minority stockholder even broader powers to have the corporation dissolved than are
presently recognized.
49. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 304 (rev. ed. 1946); LATTiN, CORPORATIONS
556 (1959); STEVENS, CORPORATIONS § 199 (2d ed. 1949).
50. LATTIN, CORPORATIONS 551 (1959).
51. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 319 (rev. ed. 1946); LATTIN, CORPORATIONS

568 (1959). Where an objective of the dissolution is sale of the assets to the
majority shareholders to exclude the minority from a profitable business, an
attempt to satisfy the minority by a cash payment may be unsuccessful. See
Tanner v. Lindell Ry., 180 Mo. 1, 79 S.W. 155 (1904); Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226 N.Y. 185, 123 N.E. 148 (1919); 2 'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 8.07 (1958).
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his own interest as a stockholder. 52 Several attempts by Delaware
corporations to include provisions in their articles waiving this right
have been held ineffective. 53 Some states have adopted statutes
which merely restate the common law rule; other statutes name
records that may be inspected, or make inspection absolutely available, or absolutely available to stockholders owning a specified percentage of the stock. In some instances the common law rule has
4
been applied to records or to stockholders not covered by the statute.5
Only in Illinois are all stockholders, whether owners of preferred
or of common stock, entitled to vote in corporate elections.5 5 Other
states permit nonvoting shares. 56 In some the nonvoting stock is
entitled to vote on matters directly affecting rights and privileges
pertaining to its class of stock.57 In most instances a shareholder may
cast his vote on the basis of one vote per share in person or through
proxy. The early common law view, however, apparently was that
each shareholder had but one vote no matter how many shares he
owned and that vote could be cast only in person. The change in
attitude has been effected by statute in some instances, but more commonly by provisions in either charter or by-laws.5 8 There is no
common law right to vote cumulatively. In some states cumulative
voting is required by constitution; in some it is authorized by statute;
and in some where there is no authority, articles or by-laws may as
9
a matter of contract provide for it.5
When a corporation declares and pays a dividend, its stockholders
are entitled to insist that their contractual preferences be observed
and that all shareholders in the same class participate pro rata. 60
52.
TIONS

BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 159-65 (rev. ed. 1946); LATTnT, CORPORA286-94 (1959); STEVENS, CORPORATIONS § 108 (2d ed. 1949); Note, Share-

holder Inspection Rights, 12 Sw. L. J. 61 (1958); 11 VAND. L. REV. 609 (1958).
53. State ex tel. Cochran v. Penn-Beaver Oil Co., 34 Del. (4 W. W. Harr.)
81, 143 Atl. 257 (1926); Des Moines Bank & Trust Co. v. Bechtel & Co., 243

Iowa 1007, 1020, 1079-80, 1098, 51 N.W.2d 174, 182-3, 215, 226 (1952); BALLANCORPORATIONS § 165a (rev. ed. 1946); Koenigsberg, Inspection of Books
TIN,
by Stockholders, 30 GEO. L. J. 227 (1942).
54. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 161 (rev. ed. 1946); LATTIn, CoRPoATIoNs
289-94 (1959); STEVENS, CORPORATIONS § 108 (2d ed. 1949).
55. ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 3; People ex rel. Watseka Tel. Co. v. Emmerson,
302 Ill. 300, 134 N.E. 707 (1922).
56. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 182 (rev. ed. 1946); LATTIn, CORPORATIONS
295 (1959); STEVENS, CORPORATIONS § 112 (2d ed. 1949).

57. STEVENS, CORPORATIONS § 112 (2d ed. 1949).
58. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 178 (rev. ed. 1946); LATTN, CORPORATIONS

295 (1959); STEVENS, CORPORATIONS §§ 112, 118 (2d ed. 1949).

59. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 177 (rev. ed. 1946); LATTIN, CORPORATIONS

295-96 (1959); STEVENS, CORPORATIONS § 117 (2d ed. 1949); Note, 7 N.Y.U.L.

REV. 487 (1929); Note, 42 VA. L. REV. 107 (1956).
60. Segerstrom v. Holland Piano Mfg. Co., 160 Minn. 95, 199 N.W. 897
(1924); Scott v. P. Lorillard Co., 108 N.J. Eq. 153, 154 Atl. 515 (1931), aff'd,

109 N.J. Eq. 417, 157 Atl. 388 (1931). See State ex rel. Sorenson v. Nebraska

State Bank, 123 Neb. 289, 294, 242 N.W. 613, 615 (1932).
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Ordinarily no shareholder is entitled to demand that any dividend
be paid, for this usually is held to be a matter within the discretion
of the board of directors. However, if the stockholder can show
abuse of discretion, he may persuade a court to order payment of a
dividend.61 The effect of the general rule is to permit the directors
to plow corporate earnings back into the business without immediate
approval 62 of the shareholders, either to expand the corporation's
activities or to revamp its existing facilities and operations.
One "advantage" which the corporation is frequently asserted to
have over many other forms of business organization is that its ownership interests are property interests which are freely transferable
without any legal effect on the business. 63 (Some minority stockholders in small corporations have found their legal right to transfer
is illusory because of the difficulty of finding a purchaser.) Many
courts have rejected attempts to deny any right of transfer or to
limit transfer to specific persons only.64 But restrictions on transfer in
the form of options to the corporation or to other stockholders to repurchase the stock, or of other nonabsolute limitations, have been
65
permitted by most courts.
Many times a corporation which has a cause of action against other
firms, or its directors, officers or employees either will not assert its
claim or will settle the claim for considerably less than the full
measure to which it may be entitled. Where this has happened for
good business reasons, a stockholder should not be entitled to interfere.66 But where the reasons are unsound, as where based on
favoritism, fraud or undue influence, an objecting stockholder should
231-32 (rev. ed. 1946); LATTIN, CORPORA459-60 (1959); STEVENS, CORPORATIONS § 99 (2d ed. 1949). A classic
case in this area is Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668, 3
61,

BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §§

TIONS

A.L.R. 413 (1919).

723 (1956).

See Note, 1959 DUKE L. J. 116; Note, 10 RUTGERS L. REV.

62. Disapproving stockholders may oppose reelection of the directors who
refused to vote for dividend payments, and, if enough votes can be obtained,
may replace those directors. Often this is not an easy task.
63. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 1 (rev. ed. 1946). See FREY, CASES ON
COPPORATIONS AND PARTNERSHIPS 4-5

(1951); LATTIN, CORPORATIONS 9

(1959);

1 O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 2.03 (1958).
64. Greene v. E. H. Rollins & Sons, Inc., 22 Del. Ch. 394, 2 A.2d 249 (1938),
87 U. PA. L. REV. 482 (1939); 2 O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS §§ 7.05, 7.06,

7.08 (1958); Cataldo, Stock Transfer Restrictions and the Closed Corporation,

37 VA. L. REV. 229, 232-33 (1951); Hayes, Corporation Cake with Partnership
Frosting, 40 IowA L. REV. 157, 160, 162 (1954); O'Neal, Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations:Planning and Drafting, 65 HA.v
L. REV. 773, 777-78 (1952). Compare Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. Wasson,
48 Iowa 336, 340 (1878), with Mason v. Mallard Telephone Co., 213 Iowa 1076,
1087, 240 N.W. 671, 676 (1932).
65. 2 O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 7.06, 7.09 (1958). See also the law
review articles cited in the preceding footnote.
66. S. Solomont & Sons Trust, Inc. v. New England Theatres Operating
Coip., 326 Mass. 99, 93 N.E.2d 241 (1950); LATTIN, CORPORATIONS 353-55 (1959);

Landstrom, Ratification by Majority Stockholders-A Problem in Corporate
Democracy, 31 B.U.L. REV. 165 (1951).
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have some remedy. While there is no common law right to assert
the corporation's cause of action in such circumstances, in equity
the shareholder may be able to do so in what is known as the "derivative suit. '67 This type of action often may be the principal check
against a rapacious management. But belief that its use has been
abused has induced a number of states to impose limitation, principally
by requiring some plaintiff-shareholders to'post security for costs of
the defendants to be paid from security in the event the defendants
win. 68
An action against the corporation may be inadequately defended,
or sometimes no defense at all may be made. There could be good
reasons from the corporation's standpoint not to defend. But if
there are none, or if the defense is inadequate, a stockholder may
be permitted to intervene on behalf of his corporation. He will not
be required to go into equity to act.69

III. POWER OF LEGISLATURE OVER ALTERATION OR MODIFICATION
Several judges have assumed that a legislature could not constitutionally authorize the majority of shareholders in a corporation to
alter common law rights of the shareholders unless all consented. 0 Is
this correct? If not entirely correct, to what extent is it true? An
answer requires consideration of three constitutional doctrines: police
power, due process and obligation of contracts. With respect to the
latter it is necessary to consider the effect of a reservation to the
legislature of the power to alter or amend corporate law.
Many judges and others who have written in this area begin with
the Dartmouth College case.7 1 Its facts, result and consequences are
commonly said to be the following: Before the American Revolution
a royal charter of incorporation for Dartmouth College was granted
under which the trustees became a self-perpetuating body. Early in
67. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §§ 143-57a (rev. ed. 1946); LATTIN, CORPORATIONS 346-93 (1959); STEVENS, CORPORATIONS §§ 167-74 (2d ed. 1949). Many of

the "common law attributes" discussed in this paper seem to have originated
in decisions of an equity court and often are involved in litigation in equity.
68. Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) involves
the constitutionality of the New Jersey statute. The first statute of this type

was N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 61-b, enacted in 1944. See BAKER & CARY, CASES
ON CORPORATIONS 678-82 (3d ed. 1958); BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 157a (rev.
ed. 1946); LATTIN, CORPORATIONS 384-88 (1959); STEVENS, CORPORATIONS § 171

(2d ed. 1949); Ballantine, Abuses of Shareholders' Derivative Suits: How Far
is California's New "Security For Expenses" Act Sound Regulation? 37
CALIF. L. REV. 123 (1949); Hornstein, The Death Knell of Stockholders' Derivative Suits in New York, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 123 (1944); Hornstein, New
Aspects of Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 47 COLUm. L. REV. 1 (1947).
69. Eggers v. National Radio Co., 208 Cal. 308, 281 Pac. 58 (1929); BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 153 (rev. ed. 1946).

70. In Glen Alden one judge of the Court of Common Pleas so held, and
the majority so intimated. See note 43 supra. See also Craddock-Terry Co.

v. Powell, 180 Va. 242, 249, 22 S.E.2d 30, 34 (1942).

71. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 712 (1819).

1959 ]

COMMON LAW ATTRIBUTES OF CORPORATIONS

275

the 1800's New Hampshire politicians, desiring control of the college
either for themselves or for the state, attempted by legislation to
change the charter by providing for selection of a substantial part of
the trustees by the state officials. With Daniel Webster as counsel
the school resisted this change, appealing to the Supreme Court, and
upset the legislation. The theory of Chief Justice Marshall was that
a contract resulted from the charter grant, which in part was between
the state (as successor to the king) and the corporation, and that the
contract could not be changed unilaterally by one of the parties to
it because this would be an unconstitutional impairment of the obligation of a contract. Justice Story suggested that had the charter
contained a clause reserving to the state the power to alter or amend
the charter, the action might have been constitutional; and every
state, seizing upon that suggestion, thereafter inserted in its constitution or corporation law a reservation of power to alter, amend or
repeal corporate charters thereafter granted.
The Dartmouth legend may be inaccurate in several respects; it
has been subjected to considerable criticism3 2 It is clear now that the
legislature would be able to change or repeal corporate charters under
the police power for health, safety and general welfare purposes even
though no power to do so was reserved as part of the contract between the corporation and the stateJ 3 Perhaps had the fourteenth
amendment been available, Dartmouth would have been decided
under the due process clause7 4 But despite the criticism of the case,
its impact must be considered in deciding what changes in corporate
attributes may be made with legislative sanction. Three principal
approaches have been suggested. One is that under its reserved
power the legislature may not make or authorize a majority to make
any changes that will affect the contract between the shareholders
themselves (unless perhaps as to matters where public interest overrides) but may change or authorize changes only in the contract between the state and the corporation. A leading spokesman for this
view is Justice Stern. A second approach is that the legislature may
make or permit a majority of the stockholders to make any changes
72. Dow v. Northern R.R., 67 N.H. 1, 36 Atl. 510 (1887) (Doe, C.J.); Attorney General v. The Railway Companies, 35 Wisc. 425, 563-69 (1874) (Ryan,

C.J.); Doe, A New View of the Dartmouth Case, 6 HARv. L. REV. 161 (1893);
Dodd, Dissenting Stockholders and Amendments to Corporate Charters, 75 U.
PA. L. REV. 585, 592 (1927); Gibson, How Fixed Are Class Shareholder Rights?
23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 283, 284-85 (1958); Polasky, Book Review, 57 McH.
L. REv. 1261, 1266-67 (1959); Note, 31 CoLuM. L. REv. 1163 (1931).
73. Stern, The Limitations of the Power of a State Under the Reserved
Right to Amend or Repeal Charters of Incorporation, 53 AMER. L. REG. 1
(1905); Note, 31 CoLum. L. REV. 1163 (1931).
74. See Stern, The Limitations of the Power of a State Under the Reserved
Right to Amend or Repeal Charters of Incorporation, 53 AMER. L. REG. 1, 2
(1905).
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except those which will deprive a stockholder of some vested right.

Among those supporting this view was Justice Layton. The third
approach is that the reserved power of the legislature is part of the
tripartite contract between state, corporation and shareholders, and
therefore the state or a majority of the shareholders when authorized
by the state may make any change as to corporate attributes without impairing any obligation of any aspect of that contract.
Justice Stern's thesis was first stated by him in a 1905 law review
article, written shortly after he began practicing law,75 and was
restated in several of his judicial opinions.76 He argued that the contract between the shareholders is separate from any contract between
the state and the corporation, indeed that it may have arisen before
the corporation was chartered and the second contract came into
being. The state could not by general law provide that any contract of
any type is subject to the state's power to alter or amend and thereby
authorize some parties to a contract (such as a partnership contract)
to change it over objections of other contracting parties. Why should
the shareholders' contract be treated differently? To him the objective of the reserved power was to quiet fears Dartmouth had raised
in some minds that a state granting a charter with no reservation of
power to alter, amend or repeal had surrendered some of its police
power and the corporation was beyond any supervisory legislative
control. Stern admitted that many decisions, including several of
the United States Supreme Court, 7" were contrary to his thesis. These
he said were erroneous, failing to recognize the problem or glossing
over it with unsatisfactory observations of "glittering generality" and
lacking logical analysis.7 8 Some, including Lauman, supported his
thesis to an extent although they permitted the majority to make
legislatively approved changes if the dissenters were paid the value of
their stock.79 But three opinions, he thought, held out promise of a
75. Stern, The Limitations of the Power of a State Under the Reserved Right
AMER. L. REG. 1, 73, 145
(1905). Justice Stern, who received his law degree and was admitted to the

to Amend or Repeal Charters of Incorporation, 53

Pennsylvania bar in 1902, practiced law in Philadelphia until 1920; was a

judge on the Court of Common Pleas, 1920-1935; a justice of the Pennsylvania
supreme court, 1935-1952; and then was chief justice of that court until his
retirement in 1956.
76. Schaad v. Hotel Easton Co., 369 Pa. 486, 87 A.2d 227 (1952); Malamount
v. Wilson Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 16 Pa. D. & C. 187 (C.P. 1932).

77. E.g., Looker v. Maynard, 179 U.S. 46 (1900)

(compulsory cumulative

voting); Sherman v. Smith, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 587 (1861) (removal of
limited liability); see Stern, The Limitations of the Power of a State Under
the Reserved Right to Amend or Repeal Charters of Incorporation, 53 AmER.
L. REG. 73, 90-106 (1905).
78. Stern, The Limitations of the Power of a State Under the Reserved
Right to Amend or Repeal Charters of Incorporation, 53 AmER. L. REG. 1

(1905).

79. See also Clearwater v. Meredith, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 25 (1863); McCray
v. Junction R.R., 9 Ind. 358 (1857) (subscriber to stock released from sub-

scription because of extension of line). Stem's concept of the several con-
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more rational and saner exposition of the law.80 In an opinion written
in 1952 Stern said many courts, if not most, were in accord with
his approach. 81 But several of the cases he cited seem instead to apply
a "vested rights" approach. 82 Several writers are in accord with
Stern's thesis,8 3 but others have considered and rejected it.8 Several
decisions since 1905 are in accord,85 but many others have permitted
tracts has been accepted by many courts for years. An early opinion doing
so is Upton v. Englehart, 28 Fed. Cas. 835 (No. 16,800) (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1874).
80. The three opinions to which he referred, 53 AmER. L. REG. at 106-09, all
involved attempts by less than unanimous stockholder consent to adopt
fundamental changes in railroad corporation contracts that had been authorized by the legislature where the legislature had the reserved power to
alter, amend, or repeal. Dow v. Northern R.R., 67 N.H. 1, 36 Atl. 510 (1887)
(lease); Zabriskie v. Hackensack & N.Y. R.R., 18 N.J. Eq. 178, 90 Am. Dec.
617 (1867) (extension of line); Kenosha, R. & R.I. R.R. v. Marsh, 17 Wis.
13 (1863) (relocation of terminal point and part of line).
81. Schaad v. Hotel Easton Co., 369 Pa. 486, 497, 87 A.2d; 227, 232 (1952). In
369 Pa. at 497-98, 87 A.2d at 232-33, he said: "[Tihe preferable view would
seem to be that this reserved power of the State to alter or amend charters
of incorporation ...

can properly be exercised only to amend a charter so far

as it represents a contract between the corporation and the State, and not
in respects as to which it constitutes a contract between the corporation and
the shareholders or between the shareholders themselves ....

Any attempted

statutory authorization of a corporation to destroy the preferential right
to the accrued dividends [on preferred stock] would seem to involve either
an unconstitutional deprivation of property, or an impairment of the obligation of contracts, or both, and this notwithstanding the reserved power of
amendment."
See Crane, Enlargement of Corporate Authority Under the Reserved Power,
15 U. PIr. L. REV. 427 (1954).
82. Consolidated Film Industries, Inc. v. Johnson, 22 Del. Ch. 407, 197 Atl.
489 (1937); Keller v. Wilson & Co., 21 Del. Ch. 391, 190 Atl. 115 (1936);
Wheatley v. A. I. Root Co., 147 Ohio St. 127, 69 N.E.2d 187 (1946).
83. 2 Coox, CORPORATIONS § 501 (8th ed. 1923); Schmidt, Constitutional
Limitations Upon Legislative Power to Alter Incidents of the Shtreholder's
Status in Private Corporations, 21 ST. Louis L. REv. 12 (1935). See BERLE,
Compare with Stern's
STuDiEs IN THE LAW OF CORPORATE FINANcE 23 (1928).
thesis, MORAWETZ, THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 1095-99 (2d ed. 1886).
84. Note, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 663 (1953). See Crane, Enlargement of Corporate Authority Under the Reserved Power, 15 U. PITT. L. REV. 427 (1954); Dodd,
Dissenting Stockholders and Amendments to Corporate Charters, 75 U. PA.
L. REV. 585, 596, 603 (1927); Lattin, Minority and Dissenting Sh-reholders"
Rights in Fundamental Changes, 23 LAw & CONTE~M. PROB. 307 (1958); Note,
7 N.Y.U.L. REV. 487 (1929).

85. Avondale Land Co. v. Shook, 170 Ala. 379, 54 So. 268 (1911); Sutton
v. Globe Knitting Works, 276 Mich. 210, 267 N.W. 815, 105 A.L.R. 1447 (1936);
Allan v. White, 103 Neb. 256, 171 N.W. 52 (1919) (change of elevator corporation from profit to cooperative not permitted even though legislature had
subsequently authorized organization of cooperatives); Yukon Mill & Grain
Co. v. Vose, 201 Okla. 376, 206 P.2d 206 (1949); Garey v. St. Joe Milling Co.,
32 Utah 497, 91 Pac. 369, 12 L.R.A., N.S. 554 (1907). In Hueftle v. Farmers
Elevator, 145 Neb. 424, 16 N.W.2d 855 (1944), the majority had voted to
change an elevator corporation, organized as a business corporation, into a
cooperative and argued that this was permssible under a provision in the
articles permitting amendments by majority vote. The court upheld a
dissenter seeking to invalidate the change, saying that this was a fundamental
change-an impairment of contract rights. See Yoakam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel, 34 F.2d 533 (D.R.I. 1929).
Earlier cases include: Byrne v. Schuyler Elec. Mfg. Co., 65 Conn. 336, 31
Atl. 833 (1895) (sale of assets; no laches); Dow v. Northern R.R., 67 N.H. 1,
36 Atl. 510 (1887) (lease); Intiso v. State, 68 N.J.L. 588, 53 Atl. 206 (1902)
(fee for withdrawing shares from building and loan association; subsequent
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majority modification. 86 Certainly Stem's views have been important
in Pennsylvania decisions, although the Glen Alden case may even87
tually lead to their rejection.
One recent federal district court decision illustrates what possibly
may be an unfortunate consequence of Stern's approach. 88 It involved
dissenter objection to sale of all corporate assets, which the dissenter
contended was a de facto merger entitling him to appraisal rights
under the merger statute89 and which the majority argued was a
statute removing fee held unconstitutional as to pre-existing memberships);
Loewenthal v. Rubber Reclaiming Co., 52 N.J. Eq. 440, 28 Atl. 454 (Ch. 1894)
(by-law provision called for amendments to by-laws only by two-thirds vote;
attempt to change to majority vote in order to change by-laws as to
election of directors which had insured minority representation on the
board); Zabriskie v. Hackensack & N.Y. R.R., 18 N.J. Eq. 178, 90 Am. Dec. 617
(Ch. 1867) (change in charter authorizing substantial extension of line);
Kenosha, R. & R.I. R.R. v. Marsh, 17 Wis. 13 (1863) (change in charter
authorizing variation in construction of line). See also Note, 31 CoLUM. L.
REv. 1163, 1167 (1931).
86. Somerville v. St. Louis Mining & Milling Co., 46 Mont. 268, 127 Pac.
464 (1912); Craddock-Terry Co. v. Powell, 180 Va. 242, 22 S.E.2d 30 (1942);
Germer v. Triple-State Natural Gas & Oil Co., 60 W. Va. 143, 54 S.E. 509
(1906). Swan v. Barnes, 117 W. Va. 147, 150, 184 S.E. 257, 258 (1936), involves a shareholder in a state bank which, pursuant to a federal statute
adopted after he acquired his shares, consolidated with a national bank at a
time when he was mentally incompetent. As the federal statute provided for
double liability, which the state law had not, the receiver of the consolidated
bank sued him. But the court held for the stockholder, who contended
he had not consented to the change and so was not a stockholder in the
resulting bank. The court said: "If .

.

. the statute under which the con-

solidation or merger was effected was not in force at the time the shares of
the objecting stockholder in the constituent company were issued, then his
shares are not subject, over his objection, or without his consent, either
express or implied, to be carried into the consolidation or merger." But
this does not necessarily support Stem's thesis or contradict the earlier
West Virginia case for the statutory authority came from Congress, which
never had reserved a power to alter or amend. (However, Congress is not
constitutionally limited by the contract clause.) See also Note, 31 COLUM.
L. REV. 1163, 1166-67 (1931).
In C. H. Venner Co. v. United States Steel Co., 116 Fed. 1012 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1902), the court refused to enjoin Steel's retirement of its preferred stock
by exchanging bonds therefor, under authority of a New Jersey statute passed
after Steel's incorporation. The court did not discuss the New Jersey cases
which support Stern's views but said the state had the reserved power to
amend and affect the stockholder contract. This case should be contrasted
with American Smelting Co. v. Bullard, 290 Fed. 896 (6th Cir. 1923), involving sale of assets of a New Jersey company without unanimous consent.
87. See Troupiansky v. Henry Disston & Sons, 151 F. Supp. 609 (E.D. Pa.
1957); Marks v. Autocar Co., 153 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Pa. 1954); Oechsle v.
Lodge Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 119 Pa. Super. 597, 181 Atl. 375 (1935).

The

reference to the possible effect of Glen Alden is based on the court's comment in that case, 143 A.2d at 31: "To divest shareholders of their right of
dissent under such circumstances would require express language which is
absent from the 1957 amendments." See Note, 47 CAIr. L. REV. 180 (1959);
Comment, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 420, 425 (1959).
88. Troupiansky v. Henry Disston & Sons, Inc., 151 F. Supp. 609 (E.D. Pa.
1957).

89. One criticism of the case was that although the court held a de facto
merger would occur it did not require the dissenter to comply with the
requirements of the merger statute to obtain his rights. DeCapriles, 1957
Annual Survey of American Law-Business Organization, 33 N.Y.U.L REV.
527, 542 (1958). In Glen Alden the court seemed to think that the merger
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sale of assets permitted by statute but for which no dissenter's remedy
was provided. Although the court talked in terms of Lauman and de
facto merger, it noted in a footnote that Pennsylvania since 1933 had
had a statute permitting the majority to authorize sale of assets for
the purchaser's stock-thus overcoming one of the objections of the
Lauman court, and it suggested that those who became shareholders
after the 1933 statute was effective could be compelled to take their
pro rata shares of the purchaser's stock rather than elect their rights
as dissenters. 90 This decision has been criticized. 91 But it suggests
that some dissenters may be treated differently from others in the
same corporation, depending on the date on which their stock was
acquired.
In states which follow Stem's view, the effect may be watered
down by assuming that the state cannot authorize changes in fundamental aspects of the shareholders' contract but by narrowing the
interpretation of what is fundamental, or broadening the interpretation of public interest which will justify state interference with
the shareholders' contract.9 2 If at the time of incorporation the
state would permit a majority of stockholders to make a particular
change, it could also be argued that this is part of the shareholders'
contract and (at least absent contrary agreement in the charter or
contract) no objector could insist that unanimous consent to make
93
that particular change was necessary.
One major objection to the view that the legislature cannot
authorize a majority in interest to make changes in the contract between shareholders is that the majority, seeking to act in the best
interests of the corporation, may be required to pay toll to an unscrupulous minority before proceeding; however, the majority doesn't
statute should be complied with, and the original transaction was abandoned
in the form projected and started over in a manner complying with the
merger statute. See note 115, infra.
90. Troupiansky v. Henry Disston & Sons, 151 F. Supp. 609 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
If this is a merger as to some, why not as to all?
91. DeCapriles, 1957 Annual Survey of American Law-Business Organization, 33 N.Y.U.L. REv. 527, 542 (1958); Note, 46 CAIaF. L. REv. 283 (1958).
But see Mulford, Corporate Distributions to Shareholders and Other Amendments to the Pennsylvania Business CorporationLaw, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 536,
563 (1958).
92. Perkins v. Coffin, 84 Conn. 275, 79 Atl. 1070 (1911); In re Collins-Doan,
3 N.J. 382, 70 A.2d 159 (1949), reversing 4 N.J. Super. 385, 67 A.2d 353
(1949), which had reversed 1 N.J. Super. 441, 61 A.2d 913 (Ch. 1948); Bingham

v. Savings Investment & Trust Co., 101 N.J. Eq. 413, 138 Atl. 659 (1927);
Rankin v. Newark Library Ass'n, 64 N.J.L. 265, 45 Atl. 622 (1900); Opdyke v.
Security Say. & Loan Co., 157 Ohio St. 121, 105 N.E.2d 9 (1952). See Dodd,
Dissenting Stockholders and Amendments to Corporate Charters,75 U. PA. L.
REv. 585, 587-91, 723, 730-34 (1927).
93. General Inv. Co. v. American Hide & Leather Co., 98 N.J. Eq. 326, 129
Atl. 244, 44 A.L.R. 60 (1925); Berger v. United States Steel Corp., 63 N.J.
Eq. 809, 53 Atl. 68 (1902); Lord v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 194 N.Y.
212, 87 N.E. 443 (1909); see Traer v. Lucas Prospecting Co., 124 Iowa 107,

99 N.W. 290 (1904).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEWO

[ VOL. 13

always have the true vision. Where the state provides that changes
authorized at the time of incorporation can be made, a further objection is that some majorities can make changes and others can't,
with little justification for the distinction other than, perhaps, maintaining the sanctity of a supposed legal theory.
In some opinions the court seems to be arguing both that there are
separate contracts, the legislature being unable to authorize changes
in the shareholders' contract, and that the minority shareholder's
rights are vested so that they can not be changed without his consent.9 Usually where the court's principal reliance is on a vested
right argument, however, it has held or assumed that the legislature
does have power to authorize some changes in the shareholders' contract. Justice Layton's opinion in Keller v. Wilson 95 is well-known for
its holding that a holder of cumulative preferred stock had a "vested
right" to unpaid dividends "already accrued" which could not be
cancelled by majority action even with legislative permission. Several
of the vested rights cases involve the unpaid, accrued, cumulative
dividend.96 Unfortunately for that particular right Layton subsequently demonstrated how easily it could be destroyed indirectly.97
A principal difficulty with the "vested right" approach is the uncertainty of its application. It has been suggested that a "vested
right" in this area is one which a court feels should not be taken
away without the loser's consent; the court's emotional attitude
94. See Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434 (1932); Sutton v. Globe Knitting
Works, 276 Mich. 200, 267 N.W. 815, 105 A.L.R. 1447 (1936); Loewenthal v.
Rubber Reclaiming Co., 52 N.J. Eq. 440, 28 Atl. 454 (Oh. 1894); Wheatley v.
A. I. Root Co., 147 Ohio St. 127, 69 N.E.2d 187 (1946); Schaad v. Hotel Easton
Co., 369 Pa. 486, 87 A.2d 227 (1952). In Berger v. Amana Society, 95 N.W.2d
909, 914-15 (Iowa 1959), the court, invalidating an amendment which
eliminated the corporation's mandatory obligation to repurchase Class A stock,
stated its conclusion with no real explanation and with no reference to either
theory.
95. Keller v. Wilson & Co., 21 Del. Ch. 391, 190 Atl. 115 (1936).
96. Consolidated Film Industries, Inc. v. Johnson, 22 Del. Ch. 407, 197 Atl.
489 (Oh. 1937); Patterson v. Henrietta Mills, 216 N.C. 728 6 S.E.2d 531 (1940);
Schaffner v. Standard Boiler & Plate Iron Co., 150 Ohio St. 454, 83 N.E.2d
192 (1948); Wheatley v. A. I. Root Co., 147 Ohio St. 127, 69 N.E.2d 187 (1946);
see Lonsdale Sec. Corp. v. International Mercantile Marine Co., 101 N.J. Eq.
554, 139 Ati. 50 (V. C. 1927); Note, 7 N.Y.U.L. REv. 487 (1929).
In Schaad v. Hotel Easton Co., 369 Pa. 486, 87 A.2d 227 (1952), Justice Stern
was not clear whether this was a vested right, although he was certain it
was a contract right which could not be impaired. See also Lake Shore &
Mich. So. Ry. v. Smith, 173 U.S. 684, 699 (1899) (fares); Shields v. Ohio, 95
U.S. 319 (1877) (fares).
97. Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 318, 11 A.2d 331 (1940),
permitting a merger of two corporations, parent and subsidiary, which had
the effect of cancelling accrued dividends. This has been carried to its extreme in Hottenstein v. York Ice Machinery Corp., 136 F.2d 944 (3d Cir.
1943), where the subsidiary into which the parent merged, sloughing off
accruals as it went, seems to have been organized principally for that
purpose. See Dodd, Accrued Dividends in Delaware Corporations-From
Vested Right to Mirage, 57 HA.v. L. REV. 894 (1944); Lattin, A Primer on
Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1 W. RFs. L. REv. 3 (1949).
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being an unpredictable reaction makes uncertain any prediction as to
the "law." The reasoning of courts in other "vested right" cases has
been severely criticized, and the usefulness of the approach challenged.98
Several well-reasoned opinions reject the "vested right" approach. 99
These assume that the reserved power of the legislature does permit
legislative authorization of majority changes. It is more difficult to
find an opinion that explains with logical articulation why the reserved power can have such effect, although many courts seems to
reach that conclusion. Some simply state that "better reasoned"
cases, or more cases, so hold, with no discussion of reasons and no
consideration of the contrary arguments. 100 The thought that reservation of power to alter or amend was intended to do more than simply
protect legislative police power seems to be involved. There may also
98. Lattin, A Primer on Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1 W. Rss. L. REV.

3 (1949), especially criticizing the two Ohio cases cited in note 95 supra.
Other material may be found collected in BAKER & CARY, CASES ON CORPORATiONS 1499 (3d ed. 1959). Note, 42 VA. L. REV. 107 (1956) assumes the "vested

rights" approach is the majority view. See Note, 31 CoLuM. L. REV. 1163,
1168-69 (1931).

99. See, e.g., McNulty v. W. & J. Sloane, 184 Misc. 835, 54 N.Y.S.2d 253

(Sup. Ct. Sp. T. 1945). Other cases rejecting the "vested rights" label for
accrued dividends are: McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., 27 F.
Supp. 639 (D. Md. 1939), aff'd, 112 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1940); Western Foundry

Co. v. Wicker, 403 Ill. 260, 85 N.E.2d 722, 8 A.L.R.2d 878 (1949); Sherman v.
Pepin Pickling Co., 230 Minn. 87, 41 N.W.2d 571 (1950), 35 MIN. L. REV. 90.

See BALLANTME, CORPORATIONS § 277 (rev. ed. 1946); LATTIN, CORPORATIONS
501-07 (1959); STEVENS, CORPORATIONS § 127 (2d ed. 1949); Gibson, How Fixed
Are Class Shareholder Rights? 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 283 (1958); Dodd,
Dissenting Stockholders and Amendments to Corporate Charters, 75 U. PA. L.
REV. 585, 610-13 (1927); Lattin, A Primer on Fundamental Corporate Changes,
1 W. RES. L. REV. 3, 25 (1949); Note, 1 DRAKE L. REV. 8 (1951); Note, 5 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 297 (1958).
In Bowman v. Armour & Co., 160 N.E. 2d 753 (III. 1959), the Illinois court
was asked again to apply the vested rights approach but was able to decide
for the stockholder without doing so by holding that the legislature had not
authorized an amendment to a provision in the corporate articles for redemption of preferred stock, which would have permitted redemption by exchange
of income debentures in lieu of paying cash.
The ultimate decision is that a shareholder's right to his shares is not
vested. Under the Delaware short-merger statute a parent corporation which
owned over ninety percent of the stock of a subsidiary was permitted to vote
for a merger of the subsidiary into the parent, with minority shareholders
of the subsidiary getting cash over their objection that they were entitled
to retain their interest in the subsidiary. Coyne v. Park & Tilford Distillers
Corp., 154 A.2d 893 (Del. 1959). Accord, Beloff v. Consolidated Edison Co.
of New York, 300 N.Y. 11, 87 N.E.2d 561 (1949).
100. Market Street Ry. v. Hellman, 109 Cal. 571, 42 Pac. 225 (1895) (action
by consolidated corporation to compel other party to contract to buy its
bonds; he defends that some of the corporations included in the consolidation did not have unanimous consent of their stockholders; court says it
assumes the legislature under its reserve power can authorize a majority
to approve consolidation); Somerville v. St. Louis Min. & Mill. Co., 46 Mont.
268, 127 Pac. 464 (1912) (relying on next case; involves less than unanimous
consent to make non-assessable stock assessable); Allen v. Ajax Min. Co.,
30 Mont. 490, 77 Pac. 47 (1904) (sale of assets); Germer v. Triple-State
Natural Gas & Oil Co., 60 W. Va. 143, 54 S.E. 509 (1906) (sale of assets).
See Note, 31 CoLum. L. REv. 1163, 1166 n. 21 (1931).
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be the thought that the majority could attain the desired objective
in other ways, without much difficulty, thus the method utilized
should not be denied. 10 1 In some cases, courts seem satisfied because
the legislature has enabled dissenting stockholders to obtain purchase
of their stock by the corporation at its "value"-which smacks of
condemnation through eminent domain.10 2 But statutes permitting
sale of assets by the majority have been upheld even though there
10 3
was no provision for dissent.
One advantage of the third approach is that it is unnecessary to
determine when a particular shareholder acquired his interest. Only
if the corporation involved was incorporated before the statutory or
constitutional reservation of power to the legislature became effective
would a minority shareholder be able to argue that a legislatively
authorized majority lacked power to adopt fundamental changes in
the shareholders' contract. 104 No longer can an unreasonable dissenter
hamstring the majority. The majority does not have absolute power
to ride roughshod over an objector, however, for he may be able to

assert successfully arguments of fraud or unfairness and, more uncommonly, lack of due process.
A number of possible common law attributes of corporations and of
stockholders were described earlier. To what extent have attempts
to change them, by legislatures or by legislatively authorized stockholder majorities, succeeded? The first series of attributes, those
relating to the corporation itself, would seem under any of the three
approaches to be subject to change under the reserved power, although for the most part it is unlikely that changes would be thought
necessary. Certainly it is not necessary that a corporation have a
seal or by-laws. Perhaps more controversy arises when a legislature
acts to recapture a franchise, and some courts have objected unless
compensation be given, although it may be better to allow compensation only if the property used in connection with the privilege is
101. See Lord v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 194 N.Y. 212, 87 N.E. 443
(1909); Lauman v. Lebanon Valley R.R., 30 Pa. 42 (1858); Note, 101 U. PA.

L.

REV. 663,

675 (1953).

BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 290 (rev. ed. 1946); STEvENs, CORPOIA§ 128 (2d ed. 1949); Levy, Rights of Dissenting Shareholders to Appraisal and Payment, 15 CORNELL L.Q. 420, 421-22 (1930); Gibson, How Fixed
Are Class Shareholder Rights? 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 283, 292 (1958).

102. See

TIONS

103. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 281 (rev. ed. 1946); BALLANTINE & STERLnGw, CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAWS § 346 (rev. ed. 1949); Warren, Voluntary
Transfers of Corporate Undertakings, 30 I-HARv. L. REv. 335, 353, 358 (1917);
Gibson, How Fixed Are Class Shareholder Rights? 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.

283, 292 (1958); Note, 46 CALIF. L. REV. 283 (1958); see Weiner, Payment
of Dissenting Stockholders, 27 COLum. L. REV. 547 note 2 (1927).
104. Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Georgia, 92 U.S. 665 (1875); see Shields
v. Ohio, 95 U.S. 319 (1877); Union Pacific R.R. v. Trustees, Inc., 8 Utah 2d 101,
329 P.2d 398 (1958).
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also taken. 105 Changes affecting several of the second series have
been readily accepted. Limited liability is sufficiently a matter of
public interest that legislative destruction of limitations or broadening
10 6
of limitations, at least as to future obligations, is permitted.
Legislatures have removed pre-emptive rights or permitted their
removal, apparently with no challenge that this is beyond the reserved power. 0 7 Legislative changes regarding dissolution have
tended to expand the ability of a minority stockholder to obtain
dissolution where dissension is present; there may be sufficient public
interest in this area that no change could be challenged as beyond the
reserved power. Most legislation relating to the right to inspect
books and records has restated the common law rule; none has
absolutely denied this right to a stockholder who would have been
entitled to it. Several attempts by incorporators or by majority
stockholders to deny the right on the authority of statutes giving
broad powers to include provisions in articles have been challenged
successfully on the basis that the statute did not authorize such
provisions. 108 Public interest would also seem to justify legislative
limitations on the bringing of derivative actions.
Changes which legislatures or majority stockholders seek to justify
on reserved power grounds are more frequently challenged when
they affect voting rights, dividends, corporate purposes, mergers and
consolidations, and sale of assets. There seems to be sufficient public
interest in protecting a minority stockholder to justify a change
105. Greenwood v. Freight Co., 105 U.S. 13 (1881). Repeals of grants of
exemption from taxation have been upheld where the corporation was subject to the state's reserved power. Tomlinson v. Jessup, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.)
454 (1872); Northern Central Ry. v. Maryland, 187 U.S. 258 (1902). Such
repeals without the aid of the reserved power have been unsuccessful. State
Bank v. Knoop, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 369 (1853); Central R.R. & Banking Co.
v. Georgia, 92 U.S. 665 (1875); see Note, 31 CoLum. L. R.v. 1163, 1166 (1931).
But an attempt under the reserved power to require a railroad to supply
1,000-mile tickets at not more than a certain price was rejected, the Court
saying: "It [the state] has no right even under such circumstances [having
a right to amend, or power to legislate on rates] to take away or destroy the
property or annul the contracts of a railroad company with third persons."
Lake Shore & Mich. So. Ry. v. Smith, 173 U.S. 684, 690 (1899).
106. Sherman v. Smith, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 587 (1861): A bank statute
containing reserved power to repeal or change provided for limited liability
at time particular bank was incorporated and was amended to provide
unlimited liability if bank continued to issue notes. It was held constitutional
since it affected only debts incurred after statute effective. See Coombes v.
Getz, 285 U.S. 434 (1932): A constitutional provision making directors liable
to creditors for money embezzled by officers was repealed while the case, a
suit against a director, was pending and the Court held that this impaired
the obligation of contract to the creditor or destroyed his vested right.
107. See Ballantine, Questions of Policy in Drafting a Modern Corporation
Law, 19 CA.w. L. REv. 465 (1931); Drinker, The Pre-emptive Right of Shareholders to Subscribe to New Shares, 43 HARv. L. REv. 586 (1930); Note, 5
ST. Louis U.L.J. 297 (1958).

108. State ex tel. Cochran v. Penn-Beaver Oil Co., 34 Del. 81, 143 Atl. 257
(1926); see note 53, supra.
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to compulsory cumulative voting'0 9 and adoption of cumulative

voting by the majority where permissive is not likely to be challenged
by the minority. In most instances where permissive cumulative
voting had been adopted, removal of the cumulative voting feature
could be challenged only as destruction of a vested right, and such
challenges have been unsuccessful." 0 However, an attempt to mutualize an insurance company so that the policyholders would elect a
majority of the directors, which was based on a statute enacted after
incorporation, was said to involve a "vested right" but was sustained
because the original contract provided for mutualization."1
Although rights to already accumulated accruals of dividends has
been held by some courts to be vested, usually the right to a future
dividend at a particular rate or with a particular preference is not
considered vested. 112 Such changes might be held beyond the reserved
power to change if that power is interpreted not to allow changes
affecting only the contract between the shareholders, but courts following that approach as to other rights have not dealt with this
situation.
The principal decisions refusing to permit adoption of changes by a
legislatively authorized majority have been in situations where the
authorization was adopted after incorporation, and the change proposed involves a substantial change in corporate purpose, merger,
consolidation or sale of the bulk of the corporation's assets, Often
these are called fundamental changes. Rarely does a court speak
of these changes as destroying vested rights." 3 But a substantial
number of courts have permitted even these changes though the
contract between the shareholders is thereby altered without unanimous consent." 4 The ultimate in destruction of rights of shareholders
109. Looker v. Maynard, 179 U.S. 46 (1900); Note, 54 HARV. L. REV. 1368

(1941); Note, 7 N.Y.U.L. REV. 487 (1929).
110. Note, 7 N.Y.U.L. REV. 487 (1929); Note, 42 VA. L. REV. 107 (1956).
111. Lord v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 194 N.Y. 212, 87 N.E. 443 (1909).

See Ballantine, Questions of Policy in Drafting a Modern CorporationLaw, 19
CA.IF. L. REV. 465, 471 (1931).

112. Peters v. U. S. Mortgage Co., 13 Del. Ch. 11, 114 Atl. 598 (1921);

Schmidt, Constitutional Limitations Upon Legislative Power to Alter Incidents of the Shareholder's Status in Private Corporations, 21 ST. Louis L.
REV. 12 (1935); Note, 31 COLUm. L. REV. 1163, 1169 (1931).

Contra, Allen v.

White, 103 Neb. 256, 171 N.W. 52 (1919). See Note, 10 RUTGERS L. REv. 723
(1956), referring to a proposed law which would give a minority stockholder
in a closed corporation a right to compel dividend payments under several
circumstances. Would this apply to corporations organized at the time such
a law becomes effective?

113. See Finch v. Warrior Cement Corp., 16 Del. Ch. 44, 141 Atl. 54 (1928)

(refusing to enjoin sale of assets for stock because of laches but allowing
dissenter cash).
114. Tanner v. Lindell Ry., 180 Mo. 1, 79 S.W. 155 (1904) (dicta that dis-

senting stockholder seeking only to enjoin sale for cash cannot be compelled

to take stock); Koehler v. St. Mary's Brewing Co., 228 Pa. 648, 77 Atl. 1016

(1910); Hills, Consolidation of Corporationsby Sale of Assets and Distribution

of Shares, 19 CALIF. L. REV. 349 (1931).
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are two recent decisions which permit a corporation owning a majority of the shares of its subsidiary to oust the minority by merging the
subsidiary into the parent and compelling the minority to accept cash
in place of their shares-the contract itself can be terminated by unilateral action.11 4a
IV. GLEN ALDEN VS. SUN CHEmcAL
As pointed out in the introduction, two rather similar cases recently
reached opposite results. Are they in conflict? Clearly they would be
if the Pennsylvania court in Glen Alden had adopted Stern's thesis
and had held unconstitutional the legislation permitting purchase of
assets without giving the purchasing corporation's dissenting stockholder an opportunity to have his stock repurchased. But the court
avoided such a holding and may have rejected it. Glen Alden can
be distinguished factually from Sun Chemical, as was indicated
earlier. For Glen Alden, though nominally the purchaser, could in
substance be treated as the seller; in any event it would have been
a greatly enlarged enterprise engaged in many new fields of activity.
There may even have been a feeling that the majority interests
failed to make sufficient showing of good faith and fairness to the
5
minority.1
V. CONCLUSION
Stern's thesis, that under the legislature's reserved power to alter,
amend or revoke corporate charters the legislature cannot change or
authorize a majority to change rights obtained by a stockholder
through his contract with other stockholders, has much logic in its
favor. However its usefulness would become less as more legislatures
provide authority for majority changes, for dissenting stockholders
in corporations organized thereafter (or possibly those acquiring their
stock thereafter)" 6 would not be able to take advantage of his
114a. Coyne v. Park & Tilford Distillers Corp., 154 A.2d 893 (Del. 1959);
Beloff v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, 300 N.Y. 11, 87 N.E.2d 561
(1949).
115. See Note, 47 CALIF. L. REv. 180 (1959). After the Glen Alden decision, the "purchase of assets" plan was abandoned, and it was proposed to
merge List into Glen Alden. This proposal which permitted dissenting
stockholders to obtain repurchase of their shares was approved and the
merger became effective April 22, 1959. List shareholders received one
share of Glen Alden for each share of List they owned; Glen Alden shareholders received 134 new shares for each share held. Following the merger,
shareholders of List owned 4,227,859 shares of the resulting company, former
List subsidiaries owned 993,300 shares, and the original Glen Alden shareholders other than the List subsidiaries owned 1,331,075 shares. See STANDARD
& POOR, CoRPoRATIoN REcoRD 2583 (1959).

116. Troupiansky v. Henry Disston & Sons, Inc., 151 F. Supp. 609 (E.D.
Pa. 1957); Intiso v. State, 68 N.J.L. 588, 53 Atl. 206 (1902); Yukon Mill &
Grain Co. v. Vose, 201 Okla. 376, 206 P.2d 206 (1949); Note, 46 CALIF. L. Rzv.
283 (1958). Stern apparently would require the corporation to be organized
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view. Rather than a mechanical result determined by the nature of
the change and the time of incorporation or of acquisition of shares,
a better solution would seem to be one in which each change is
analyzed in terms of good faith and fairness. Equitable limitations
on the power of a majority should be utilized. Unfortunately some
courts seem to have been overly restrained in their analysis of
fairness," 7 but as has been said elsewhere, "there is no good reason
why able judges without the aid of additional legislation cannot
remedy this matter."118 Some courts have.119 If the equity courts do
not, on their own, then the legislature should enable them to do so.
after the statutory change. Schaad v. Hotel Easton Co., 369 Pa. 486, 495, 87
A.2d 227, 231 (1952); Note, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 663, 672 (1953).
117. Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 27 Del. Ch. 127, 32 A.2d 148 (Ch. 1943);
see Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 198 (D. Del. 1943), aI'd,
146 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1944); BAKER & CARY, CASES ON CORPORATIONS, 1516-21
(3d ed. 1959); Dodd, Accrued Dividends in Delaware Corporations-From
Vested Rights to Mirage, 57 HARV. L. REV. 894 (1944); Dodd, Fair and Equitable Recapitalizations,55 HAnv. L. REV. 780 (1942).
118. Lattin, A Primer on Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1 W. RES. L. REv.

3, 26 (1949). See also Gibson, How Fixed Are Class Shareholder Rights?, 23
& CONTEITP. PROB. 283, 295-306 (1958); Lattin, A Reappraisal of Ap-

LAw

praisal Statutes, 38 MIcH. L. REV. 1165, 1183 (1940); Latty, Fairness-The

Focal Point in Preferred Stock Arrearage Elimination, 29 VA. L. REV. 1

(1942); Note, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 663, 675 (1953).
119. Outwater v. Public Service Corp., 103 N.J. Eq. 461, 143 Atl. 729 (Ch.
1928), aff'd, 104 N.J. Eq. 490, 146 Atl. 916 (Ct. Err. & App. 1929); BAKER &
CARY, CASES ON CORPORATIONS 1551-54 (3d ed. 1959); Meck, Accrued Dividends

on Cumulative Preferred Stocks: The Legal Doctrine, 55 HAnv. L. REv. 71
(1941). See Jones v. Missouri-Edison Elec. Co., 144 Fed. 765 (8th Cir.
1906).

